John Earman and John T. Roberts advocate a challenging and radical claim regarding the semantics of laws in the special sciences: the statistical account. According to this account, a typical special science law "asserts a certain precisely defined statistical relation among well-defined variables" (Earman and Roberts 1999) and this statistical relation does not require being hedged by ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, we raise two objections against the attempt to cash out the content of special science generalizations in statistical terms.
increases (decreases), the price decreases (increases)' is false if read as a strict generalization, because there may be state interventions and other factors which lead to counterinstances to the strict generalization. This is the first horn of the dilemma ("falsity").
If, on the other hand, the law is hedged by a cp-clause, then Galileo's law becomes 'whenever a body falls (freely), it falls according to the equation: s = ½ gt 2 , unless some interfering factor intervenes'. This claim appears to be trivially true, at least if the notion of an interfering factor is not further specified. If what is meant by an interfering factor is simply 'a factor that makes the law turn out to be false', the hedged claim says no more than 'the relation s = ½ gt 2 holds, unless it does not'. This is the second horn of the dilemma ("trivialty") . In what follows, we will call this 'Lange's dilemma' (named after Marc Lange 1993, 235) . The dilemma poses a challenge for an account of truth-conditions of cplaw statements.
Statistical Accounts of special science laws
Earman and Roberts are quite pessimistic with regard to spelling out the truth conditions of cp-laws. However, this is not a major problem, they argue, because fundamental laws are not in need of cp-clauses and special science generalizations should not be understood as cp-laws either. Rather cp-laws play the scientific role of gesturing towards underlying generalizations that are more precise and not in need of cp-clauses:
[A] 'ceteris paribus law' is an element of a 'work in progress', an embryonic theory on its way to being developed to the point where it makes definite claims about the world. It has been found that in a vaguely defined set of circumstances, a given generalizations has appeared to be mostly right or mostly reliable, and there is a hunch that somewhere in the neighborhood is a genuine, well-defined generalization, for which the search is on. (Earman and Roberts 1999, 466 ; emphasis added)
The essential point in this quote is that the preliminary formulation of a cp-law -that is "mostly right or mostly reliable" -belongs to the "context of discovery" of a search for a well-defined generalization. In the case of the special sciences, the result of the successful search for a well-defined generalization is a statistical generalization. By way of illustration Earman and Roberts refer to a case Kincaid discusses as an example of a statistical generalization: Jeffery Paiges' study of revolutions in agrarian societies. Earman and Roberts discuss one of Paiges' empirical findings as an example of a special science generalization: commercial hacienda systems tend to lead to agrarian revolt, whereas plantation systems tend to lead to labor reform (also mentioned in Roberts 2004, 165) . Paiges argues for these claims on the basis of classifications (e.g. hacienda systems as opposed to other agrarian systems) and statistical analyses.
The statistical account permits two readings. According to the first and more liberal reading, Earman and Roberts reconstruct Paiges' statistical generalization as follows: 'It is mostly true that commercial hacienda systems lead to agrarian revolt, whereas plantation systems lead to labor reform.' This mostly-statement is true, if it is the case that a generalizations holds in the majority of intended applications, i.e. if it is the case that in the majority of agrarian systems the generalization 'if it is a commercial hacienda, then …' holds. It is essential to this reading that a special science generalization is qualified by the operator 'it is mostly true. For this reason we will call this reading of the statistical account the 'mostly-reading'. It is worth stressing two points regarding this reading: firstly, a sentence of the form 'it is mostly the case that p' allows 'p' to be a deterministic as well as statistical a generalization. Secondly, Earman and Roberts claim that there is no need of a cpclause. The clause has been replaced by 'it is mostly right'. The non-strict character of the generalization is derived from the fact that the generalization does not hold in all (but the majority of) intended applications.
Elsewhere Earman and Roberts present their account of special science generalizations in slightly different words. Typical special science generalizations, they argue, are claims about "actual correlation among variables across various populations" (Earman and Roberts 1999, 467) . These statements assert "a certain precisely defined statistical relation among well-defined variables" Roberts 1999: 467, also Roberts 2004) . That is, special science laws are statistical generalizations of the following form:
In population H, a variable P is positively statistically correlated with variable S across all sub-populations that are homogeneous with respect to the variables V 1 , …, V n (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467 Schurz's normic laws can be understood as an instance of the actual-correlation reading.
Schurz's as well as Earman and Roberts' views have in common that they reconstruct special science generalizations, which appear to be hedged by a lazy cp-clauses, as statistical generalizations.
The statistical account of special science generalizations (both according to the mostly-reading and the positive-correlation reading) appears to be promising in at least three important respects:
1. Prima facie, a non-lazy cp-clause is not needed.
Statistical generalizations are indeed (dis)confirmable by evidence.
3. Statistical generalizations stating correlations capture the non-strict, non-universal, and exception-ridden character of generalizations in the special sciences.
If the statistical account could be defended for special science generalizations the pay-off would indeed be considerable. We will, however, argue that this account does not work. It may be adequate for some special science generalizations but not as a general account of special science generalizations. In what follows we present two arguments against the statistical account. The first argument is directed against the mostly-reading. The second argument is directed against both readings.
7 Schurz (2001 Schurz ( , 2002 provides an evolution-theoretic argument for the statistical consequence thesis. A discussion of this argument would exceed the length of this paper (cf. also Reutlinger, Hüttemann and Schurz 2011: section 8.1). Instead we focus only on the conclusion (i.e. the normic account as a special case of the statistical account).
Objection I: Cartwright's Dilemma
In this section, we primarily address the mostly-reading. 8 That is, we are interested in the claim that special science generalizations that appear to need a cp-clause, ought to be reconstructed as asserting that the generalization in question holds mostly.
We will start with a problem that Nancy Cartwright posed. The point of presenting the problem is not that those generalizations that can in fact be reconstructed according to the mostly-reading fall under the problem. Rather, the problem highlights the fact that there are many special science generalizations that cannot be reconstructed according to this reading in the first place. In her How the Laws of Physics Lie, Cartwright presents an argument whose main target is the covering law model of scientific explanation. However, the force of the argument carries over to the statistical account. The gist of the argument can be stated as a dilemma for cp-laws:
Ceteris paribus generalizations, read literally without the 'ceteris paribus' modifier, are false. […] . On the other hand, with the modifier the ceteris paribus generalizations may be true, but they cover only those few cases where the conditions are right. (Cartwright 1983, 45) .
The horns of this dilemma are falsity and restricted applicability. Newton's first law is an example (again from physics -we will turn to examples from the special sciences shortly) which can be used to illustrate the dilemma:
Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (Newton 1999, 416) Without the qualification "unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it" Newton's first law is false. On the other hand, if the law is qualified by a cpclause, then it applies to very few cases (if any cases at all). Call this dilemma: Cartwright's dilemma. It is worth noting that Cartwright's dilemma differs from Lange's dilemma, as the horns of the latter are falsity and triviality (see Section 3). Unlike in the case of Lange's dilemma, Cartwright's point is not that cp-laws might be trivially true but rather that it is difficult to see why we should care about them if they cover only rarely occurring situations.
The dilemma is not a dilemma for those special science generalizations that might be adequately reconstructed according to the mostly-reading (we have not argued that there aren't any). The important point of the dilemma is that the mostly-reading cannot be a general account of special science laws. The dilemma highlights the fact that there are many generalizations, which appear to need a cp-clause (whether special science or not), because the generalizations cover only rare cases and can thus not be reconstructed as applying to most cases. 9 The important point for the goal of our paper is thus one of the premises of It is worth pointing out that the problem of 'falsity and restricted applicability' is not genuine to exclusive cp-conditions. The problem might very well arise in the case of comparative cp-laws such as 'if the supply of a commodity increases (decreases), the price decreases (increases)'. As we have seen this statement is a comparative cp-law because (among other things) it requires that certain factors remain constant (e.g. demand). Should we read this cp-law as asserting that (among other things) the constancy of demand is a condition that obtains frequently, i.e. in most markets? It is unlikely -this assumption would presumably turn the law into a straightforward falsehood.
The conclusion we want to draw is that it is inadequate to reconstruct laws of the special sciences as claims about what mostly happens. While it may be true in some cases that a (deterministic or probabilistic) law statement holds in most intended applications, this cannot be a necessary condition for their truth or for their respectability.
One additional remark: we have objected to replacing cp-clauses by phrases such as "it is mostly true". However, the core of our objection is not concerned with the vagueness of "mostly". More importantly, we worry that very often whether or not a generalization is accepted as a cp-law does not at all depend on the frequency with which the relevant conditions are actualized. It is not in general part of the content of a special science law or generalization to state how often (whether characterized vaguely or quantitatively precise) its antecedent conditions are fulfilled (for a similar observation see Hempel 1988, section 5).
Objection II: Lange's dilemma and non-lazy cp-conditions
Our second objection applies to the positive-correlation-reading and -a fortiori -to the mostly-reading too. According to the positive-correlation-reading, the statistical character of a special science generalization accounts for the exceptions -that is, a generalization has exceptions in the sense that it is a claim about non-trivial conditional probabilities. The following might be an illustration: in all agrarian societies a certain non-strict correlation (e.g. between a certain kinds of farming and kinds of political activities) holds -provided a certain finite number of conditions 10 obtains (stated as the claim that the variables V 1 , …,
V n takes particular values). According to Earman and Roberts, one does not need a cp-
clause because a non-strict correlation naturally allows for exceptions. However, it is difficult to see how this move could provide a solution to the problem of interpreting special science generalizations. In the remainder of this section, we provide an objection to the positive-correlation reading. This is our second objection to the statistical account of special science generalizations.
Our objection consists in the worry that the statistical account does not get rid of non-lazy cp-conditions. If this worry is justified, then the statistical account does not live up to Earman and Roberts's original aspirations of providing an account of special science laws that does not rely on non-lazy cp-conditions (see end of Section 4). The question we want to press is whether Earman and Roberts are justified to claim that the conditions can be considered to be lazy cp-conditions. To be precise, conditions are stated in terms of the variables in {V 1 , …, V n } taking a certain (range of) value(s). As mentioned in Section 2, cp-conditions are lazy if the list of conditions is either finite ('lazy 1 ') or finite and entirely in the scope of a special science ('lazy 2 '). It is a striking fact that Earman and Roberts do not present an argument for the claim for the claim that the list of variables V 1 , …, V n and, thus, the corresponding list of conditions is finite (which is tantamount to the claim that the cp-conditions are lazy cp-conditions). We think they need an argument.
How The supposition concerning Earth's magnetic field falls outside of island biogeography's range of interest. It twiddles with a parameter that island biogeography takes no notice of, or at least does not take it as a variable. (Lange 2002, 418) In other words, the condition that the magnetic field of the Earth has its actual strength is a relevant condition, i.e. whether it obtains makes a difference to the truth or falsity of the area law. However, this condition is not salient in context of island biogeography.
What precisely do these examples show? First, they show that we have a good reason to speak of a non-lazy 2 cp-conditions that are relevant for statistical generalizations:
that is, these conditions are not in the conceptual and methodological scope of the discipline in question and can thus not be captured by a statistical generalization formulated in the terminology of the special science in question. Thus, understanding special science laws as probabilistic generalizations does at least not replace non-lazy 2 cp-conditions.
12
However, even if these conditions are non-lazy 2 they need not be non-lazy 1 . That is, even if the conditions cannot be stated in the vocabulary of the special science, there might be a finite list, if one allows for further conceptual and methodological resources (of other sciences). However, Earman and Roberts provide no argument for the claim that a finite list of such conditions will be available. Nor is there an argument for the claim that a finite list of conditions that fall inside the scope of the relevant special science can be given.
Secondly, if statistical special science laws have either (i) non-lazy 2 -conditions that are at the same time non-lazy 1 (i.e. no finite list of them can be provided), or (ii) there are 12 Ironically for Earman and Roberts, Hempel (1988, 152f) argues for this point against Carnap. additional non-lazy 1 cp-conditions that fall inside the scope of the special science in question (if such a case is conceivable), then, we argue, the statistical approach cannot avoid
Lange's dilemma. Suppose there is a non-lazy condition C for a higher-level statistical law To sum up the result of our second objection, the statistical account does not succeed in solving a problem it was designed for: it fails to dispense with non-lazy cpconditions.
We will conclude this section by discussing a possible objection to our argument.
One might object that the statistical account captures nicely that -and even explains whythere are exceptions to a nomic relation. According to the statistical account, a higher-level statistical law simply describes a frequency that is the result of lazy and non-lazy interferers. One kind of referring to these interfering factors is to speak of 'noise' coming from the environment of the system under description.
We respond to this objection that it is true that in some cases these frequencies obtain and they can be explained by (environmental or lower-level) interfering factors (cf.
Strevens 2008, chapter 10, for an elaborate account of explaining frequencies in this way).
However, as we have argued in section 5, in the case of many laws there is not a good reason to believe that there are many of the frequencies required by the statistical account.
Even if we focus on cases in which the relevant frequencies exist and in which the frequencies are the result of lower-level interfering or enabling factors, we would like to insist that the description of these lower-level factors is at least non-lazy 2 exercise. However, this is just what Earman and Roberts seem to deny.
Conclusion
Earman and Roberts advocate the statistical account of special science laws. At first glance, their account has the advantage of capturing the non-strict character of special science generalizations without being committed to allegedly problematic cp-conditions. We have presented two objections to the statistical account. The first objection attempts to establish the view that -contrary to the mostly-reading of the statistical account -it is not correct to say that special science generalizations should be interpreted as statements about what happens in most intended applications of the law. According to our second objection, the statistical account does not get rid of non-lazy cp-conditions. Hence, we conclude that the statistical account does not qualify as a general account of special science laws.
We will conclude with a brief outlook. If our arguments are sound, then statistical account does not succeed in dispensing with cp-conditions. This result motivates the follow- for the fact that referring to a disposition, which is not completely manifest, might nevertheless contribute to an explanation of an actual phenomenon. Furthermore (2), the laws of composition help to explain how we might gain evidence for how a system would behave in the absence of disturbing factors even if actual disturbing factors are present. The contribution of the disturbing factors can be calculated and -on the basis of the laws of composition -it can be 'subtracted'. This shows that at least some exclusive cp-laws are empirically testable. Reutlinger (2011) advocates an updated version of a completer account.
This approach accounts for the truth conditions of a cp-generalization by relying on two essential concepts: (a) the concept of minimal invariance captures a relevance relation between the variables explicitly figuring in the generalization, and (b) the notion of a quasiNewtonian law is used to describe the influence of disturbing factors.
